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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
It is for these reasons that incontrovertible physical
facts should be supported by some means of credible evidence as pointed out in (3) above.
Nicholas Unkovic

VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS LIMITING LIABILITY
FOR NEGLIGENCE AS BETWEEN PRIVATE

INDIVIDUALS
The decisions of -Pennsylvania as to contracts generally which limit liability for negligence are apparently
much in conflict. The law is well settled that carriers and
innkeepers cannot so contract., The reason is sound.
These are businesses so affected with a public interest that
the protection of public safety and of public property
demand this safeguard. The individual does not deal with
them on a basis of equality. Use of them is oftentimes a
necessity. Consequently, he cannot afford to haggle. He
prefers rather to accept any terms, often indeed (especially
where the contract is created by notice) without knowing
what contract he does make.
Where railroads have contracted, however, not in their
character as common carriers but as individuals, a different conclusion has been reached. Thus, contracts by a
railroad not to be held liable for fires negligently caused on
premi-ses leased to individuals along the right of way or
along purely private sidings, have been upheld,2 on the
ground that "the railroad owes no duty to the public in
connection therewith". 3
A similar result was reached where mining companies
contracted not to be held liable for collapse of surface sup'Grogan v. Express Co., 114 Pa. 523 (1887); Express Co. v. Sands,
55 Pa. 140 (1867); Hoyt v. Clinton Hotel Co., 35 Pa. Super Ct. 97
(1907).
2
Rundall & Co. v. R. R. Co., 254 Pa. 529 (1916); Stoneboro v. R.
R. Co., 238 Pa. 289 (1912).
gStoneboro v. R. R. Co., 238 Pa. 289 (1912).
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port, though due to the company's negligence. 4 And the
same result was reached in landlord and tenant cases,
where the lessee agreed he would not hold the lessor liable
"for loss of property however occurring" from lessor's occupancy above him. 5 In Rose v. Finance Co.,6 Magill, J.
said:
"We have been referred to no case and in our examination have found none, in which it has been held
that such a contract between persons conducting a
strictly private business and relating to their personal
and private affairs, is opposed to public policy".
Moreover, by implication, several times it has been
laid down that in a purely private transaction, individuals
could release themselves from liability for their own
negligence. 7 In these cases, the courts have construed
the contracts as not covering the situation involved, but
have intimated strongly that the contracts were valid.
The statement of Justice Sadler in Schroede' v. Gulf Refining Co.,8 is typical of this line of cases:"A party may contract for indemnity against the
results flowing from his own acts, but the intent of
both parties must be clear; precise and unequivocal".
Were these the sum total of Pennsylvania decisions,
the conclusion would be irrefutable that, except when made
by common carriers and innkeepers, contracts limiting
liability for negligence are valid. However, in Lancaster
4

Atherton v. Coal Co., 267 Pa. 433 (1920); Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co.,
274 Pa. 489 (1922); Jordan v. Coal Co., 270 Pa. 216 (1921), and cases
there cited.
5
Lerner v. Heickler, 89 Pa. Super Ct. 234 (1926); Rose v. Finance
Co., 21 Dist. Ct. 490 (1912); for same conclusion where provision
was against "any and all" damage for water, see Cannon v. Bresch,
160 Atl. 595, (1932), (Pa.), and cases there cited.
621 Dist. Ct. 490 (1912).
7Schroeder v. Gulf Refining Co., 300 Pa. 406 (1930); Camden
Co. v. Eavenson, 295 Pa. 357 (1928); Perry v. Payne, 217 Pa. 252
(1907); Crew v. Bradstreet, 134 Pa. 161 (1890); Duncan v. Dun, 7 W.
N. C. 246 (1879); see Cannon v. Bresch, 160 Ati. 595, (1932), (Pa.).
8300 Pa. 406 (1930).
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Bank v. Smith, in a suit against the bank for negligently
handing over the contents of a safe deposit box to the
wrong person, the court, first deciding that there was no
evidence of a contract limiting liability for negligence,
added "We have more than once held that a bailee cannot
stipulate against liability for his own negligence".
This broad dictum was repeated in several carrier and
innkeeper cases."
Also, in Balone v. Heavey," in which a
garage-keeper set up a contract limiting liability as a defense to a suit charging negligence in permitting an automobile to be stolen, Glass, J., held that "the law in this
state is well-settled that a bailee cannot stipulate against
liability for his own negligence".
RECONCILING THE DECISIONS
The question thus arises whether these latter decisions
can be reconciled with the right-of-way, the mining, the
landlord and tenant, and the implication of the other cases,
supra. One distinction is that in those cases where the
contract has been upheld, there is a passage of property
from the indemnitee. Simplified, the situation is this: X
passes his property to Y for Y's use with the proviso that
subsequent acts of X in connection therewith shall not expose X to liability for negligence. This, it might be suggested, justifies a different rule than where X passes his
property to Y for some services to be rendered thereon by
Y and Y contracts not to be liable in rendering these services. But such a distinction has no application here.
There is no basic difference as regards the validity of contracts between leasing one's property with the proviso
that the lessor shall not be liable for his negligence in connection therewith; and the leasing of one's services with
the same provision.
The ground upon which contracts limiting liability for
962 Pa. 55 (1869).
10Hoyt v. Clinton Hotel Co., supra; Farnham v. Camden R. R.
Co., 55 Pa. 53 (1867).
1115 D. & C. 437 (1931); affirmed in 103 Pa. Super Ct. 529
(1932).
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negligence have been declared invalid is public policy;12 to
maintain a legal deterrent to negligence that might otherwise become widespread. Applying that test, for example,
to the case of the garage-keeper 3 and the railroad right
of way" we find the following:
The garage-ma 1 has ample reason to be careful aside
from his legal liability. He is selling his services to the
community. Negligence costs him further business from
the particular customer and probably from others also.
Few men speak as convincingly and as frequently as an
injured one. Moreover, the garageman's negligence in permitting the car to be stolen will, at the utmost, result in
damage to property only; no life will be endangered. On
the other hand, where a railroad leases property along its
right of way to an individual, there is no incentive for the
railroad to be careful once its legal liability is released. It
has nothing to lose. Its business will not be harmed by
damage caused the lessee. In addition, fire endangers not
only property but lives also. Thus, there is much more
reason for insisting upon the legal liability in the case of
the railroad than of the garage.
There is, however, a valid distinction between the
cases where contracts limiting liability for negligence have
been upheld and those where such contracts have been
held invalid. It is the difference that exists where a business
of quasi-public character deals with considerable members
of the public as contrasted with a transaction between two
individuals. Where the contracts have been held invalid,
it will be noticed first, that invariably the business is one
dealing with a large number of persons; and second, that
non-liability for negligence really constituted not a particular contract but the condition on which the services
were offered to the public. In such a case the public is
not dealing on an equal basis; there is little or no opportunity for choice; and the situation closely approximates
22Cases cited in notes 1, 9, 10.
13Balone v. Heavey, supra.
U'Rundall & Co. v. R. R. Co., supra; Stoneboro v. R. R. Co.,
supra.
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that of carriers, innkeepers and warehousemen. Conversely, where two individuals deal at arms' length, there
is equality. A clear-cut contract is entered into by both
with their eyes open, the lesser liability probably being
compensated with a lesser price. For that reason, the
freedom to contract should not be unnecessarily narrowed.
ON PRINCIPLE

The -question remains whether, apart from the decisions, all contracts limiting liability for negligence should
not be invalid.
The freedom of contract is a constitutional right
limited in some instances by public policy, the right of the
State to protect the Common Weal. Thomson, J., in Payne
v. National Transit Co.," points out:
"Many cases have held, -in substance, that the
power to declare a contract void as being in contravention of public policy is a very delicate power and should
be exercised only in cases free from doubt."
Decisions relative to contracts limiting liability for
negligence are very sparse in their discussions. For the
most part, there is a bald statement that such an agreement is contrary to public policy. Evidently, they proceed
on the assumption that once legal liability is released,
negligence will be tremendously increased. But that conclusion is based on two false premises:, first, that the one
releasing the other from negligent liability is unable to
make a different contract and preserve the legal safeguard;
and second, that those thus released will become negligent,
as a matter of course. But, in the first place, the parties
are free to contract otherwise. A party not wishing to
assume the risk is free to refuse it. Secondly, at least an
equal incentive to the exercise of care is the demandv of
good business. Damaged goods mean a dissatisfied customer resulting in loss of business to the negligent party.
It is incumbent upon him as much from the business viewpoint as from the legal viewpoint to exercise due care of
15300 Fed. 415 (1921).
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others' property. Also it is fair to assume that those who
would take undue advantage of such a contract would
avail little satisfaction in a suit.
But why should a party wish to contract away his
liability for negligence? There is ample reason. It may
be the honest desire to save himself the trouble and litigation of flimsy or trumped-up charges of negligence. The
individual may generally exercise due care since it is good
business to do so, but there is always the possibility of a
finical or dishonest customer making unwarranted complaints. It is against these instances that such a contract
is useful. Because of this such contracts do not necessarily tinge of fraud.
Consequently, contracts limiting liability for negligence as between individuals are valid because as in the
words of Bradly, J., in Railroad Co. v. Lockwood:' 6
"If the customer had any real freedom of choice,
if he had any reasonable and practicable alternative,
and if the employment were not a public one, it could
with reason be said to be his private affair, and no
concern of the public."
A concluding word of warning might not be amiss.
The Courts of Pennsylvania have more than once held that
contracts which limit liability that would otherwise be imposed are regarded with disfavor and will be construed
strictly.1 7

Therefore,

those

who

contemplate

releasing

negligent liability would do well to examine closely the
cases where such contracts have been upheld, in addition
to particularizing, as far as possible in the contract the
situations sought to be covered.
Spencer R. Liverant
1617 Wallace 368 (1873).

"Cases cited in note 7.

